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INTRODUCTION 
Little Cottonwood Creek flows through property which Mclntyre and his 
wife own. The parcel consists of about three acres (roughly two acres east of the 
creek and one to the west). Mclntyre wanted a bridge to connect the two sides of 
his property and building a bridge requires a permit from the State Engineer. 
Once granted, a permit allows the applicant one year to complete the alteration of 
the natural stream's bed and banks to the extent necessary to build the bridge. 
Once expired, work must be complete and any farther or new alteration (such as 
stream disturbance for bridge removal), may only be allowed by a subsequent 
permit. 
Mclntyre made application and the State Engineer notified all interested 
parties including the Browns and Sorensons, ("Appellants") of the application and 
invited them to comment. They did so, protesting to the Application. The permit 
was granted on October 11, 2006, after which Appellants requested State Engineer 
reconsideration, which was granted. They commented farther, but again the 
permit was granted. Mclntyre began construction of the bridge after receiving the 
Permit in October 2006 because, as the permit states, it would expire on Oct. 11, 
2007(Appendix A.) Mclntyre wanted the bridge built and the permitted 
disturbance completed, before high water. 
On December 15, 2006 Appellants filed a complaint in District Court before 
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Judge Iwasaki, seeking two things and two things only, to wit: 
Appellants sought a reversal of the State Engineers approval of Mclntyre's 
permit application granted on October 11, 2006, which would expire on 
October 11, 2007; and, 
• They sought a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin and restrain 
Mclntyre from constructing a bridge. They chose not to seek an emergency 
TRO at that time. 
Mclntyre moved to dismiss, arguing that unlike the application process 
where interested parties were allowed to comment, to appeal the decision 
Appellants must be "persons aggrieved" by the decision to have standing to appeal 
in the District Court. During briefing of Mclntyre's motion construction openly 
and obviously proceeded without Appellants seeking to enjoin it. Oral argument 
was then scheduled for April 16, 2007. 
On March 23, 2007, five months after the permit was issued, Appellants 
sought an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to 
halt the construction of the bridge. (R. 159 - 211.) An "on record" hearing was 
held in chambers on that day and the Temporary Restraining Order and a 
preliminary injunction restraining further construction were denied. Appellants 
did not seek an appeal from that ruling and the bridge was soon completed. 
On April 16, 2007the trial court heard Mclntyre's motion to dismiss for lack 
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of standing. Relying to some extent on the proffers of March 23 , Judge Iwasaki 
ruled Appellants lacked standing and dismissed the case. 
The bridge was finished before the permit expired on October 11, 2007. 
Mclntyre believes, inter alia, it is procedurally and practically meaningless to 
remand to the trial court for consideration of an expired permit or to enjoin the 
construction of a bridge when construction is finished. 
STATEMENT O F JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2001). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Whether the Appellants were "person[s] aggrieved" under Utah Code Ann. 
§73-3-14(l)(a) (1987), and thus had standing to appeal the granting of a stream 
alteration permit to Mclntyre by the State Engineer. Appellants incorrectly state 
the standard of review. It is a mixed question of law and fact. Utah Chapter of 
the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, f 13 (standing would 
generally be considered a ''mixed question" because it involves the application of 
a legal standard to a particularized set of facts. Citing, Kearns-Tribune Corp, v. 
Wilkinson, 946P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997). 
STATEMENT O F THE CASE 
Appellant has correctly stated the nature of the case and the decision below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mclntyre concedes the statement of facts set forth by Appellants except to 
add the following: 
1 Appellants fail to allege that either Appellant owns property adjoining the 
west bank of Little Cottonwood Creek, or property on the first level flood 
plain. Thus, flooding and erosion caused by Little Cottonwood Creek 
would not be to Appellants' property. (R. 1-8, 28 & 69.) 
2 The permit in question was issued by the State Engineer on October 11, 
2006 and expired last year on October 11, 2007. (Appendix A.) 
3 The Secor report upon which Appellants rely, when fairly read, does not 
state that the construction of Mclntyres' bridge will cause harm, but rather 
even without the bridge the west bank of the creek and the escarpment 
area are at "significant risk of further erosion and potential property 
damage. Building the bridge only increases the risk..." (R. 26 under the 
subheading "recommendations".) 
4 The second Secor report also suggests that the decking of the bridge may 
cause floating debris to be caught at times of extreme flooding, but fails to 
note that the bridge design itself allows for the deck to be lifted off during 
greater than normal spring flooding. (R. 65-68.) 
5 Although the minute entry reflects that an "on record" TRO hearing was 
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held on March 23, 2007, no transcript was ordered or is available. (R. 212.) 
6 Judge Iwasaki relied upon the facts adduced at the March 23, 2007 hearing 
during the April 16, 2007 hearing which is at issue here. (R. 252, T. P. 3, 
lines 9 -18.) 
SUMMARY O F THE ARGUMENT 
First, the remedy Appellants seek - reconsideration and revocation of the 
Permit - cannot redress the alleged injury. The bridge has been built. The Permit, 
which is essentially a building permit, much like one issued to build a house, has 
expired. Therefore, even if this Court remands this case to the trial court and 
Appellants establish standing, there is nothing left to review. The permit had a 
time limit in which to complete construction and the construction has been 
completed. Nothing in Appellants' complaint, the law, or the Permit itself 
requires the bridge to be dismantled upon expiration of the permit, even if it could 
be re-examined by the State Engineer. 
Also, Appellants simply are not in harms way and cannot establish they 
were aggrieved parties who were entitled to appeal to the District Court; nor does 
their complaint itself make that claim. Whether one is an "aggrieved party" under 
the statute is governed by the traditional standing requirements. However, under 
Utah's standing test all three factors must be met. Here, the factual allegations of 
Appellants5 38 paragraph complaint do not meet the test. 
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Appellant's complaint fails to allege that the Sorensons or Browns have or 
will suffer any particularized injury. Both Sorensons and Browns are unable to 
allege that they have been or will be injured because the bridge was built. 
Unlike the affiants in Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, here, there is no claim that 
if the bridge is built, necessarily Appellants will be flooded or will suffer erosion, 
but rather that building the bridge may increase the risk of erosion to an 
escarpment (which is owned by a third party) when either the stream flow is 
abnormally high or is dammed by Mclntyre's bridge. If the escarpment is eroded 
then Appellant Brown may suffer exacerbation of their existing settling problem. 
However, Appellant's own experts are unable to causally connect Brown's settling 
to escarpment erosion. 
Moreover, no paragraph of Appellants' complaint suggests a plausible 
connection between the Mclntyre bridge and any harm to the Appellants. At 
most, an attachment to the complaint, the Secor report commissioned by 
Appellants, states that the entire west bank and the escarpment area are already at 
significant risk of erosion without the bridge. The bridge only potentially 
increases the risk. But neither of the Appellants own the escarpment property 
which Secor suggests as being at risk of erosion, nor for that matter does 
Mclntyre. Only Mclntyre and his neighbor Calder own any property on the West 
bank in the potential flood plain. The sole particularized injury either appellant 
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can point to is settlement of Brown's property which the Secor report suggests 
needs further study to causally understand. (R. at 26, recommendations.) 
Finally, the Appellants acknowledged that they had made a calculated 
choice not to seek temporary or preliminary injunctive relief at the outset and to 
rely upon permanent injunctive relief should the bridge be constructed. (R. 132.) It 
is unclear from Appellants' complaint how a permanent injunction once a bridge 
is constructed could ever be issued to enjoin construction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS ARE NOT AGGRIEVED PARTIES AND ARE UNABLE TO MEET 
THE TRADITIONAL STANDING REQUIREMENTS. 
Appellants correctly set forth the analysis necessary to determine whether a 
party has standing. 
The first step in the inquiry will be directed to the traditional criteria of the 
plaintiffs personal stake in the controversy. One who is adversely affected 
by governmental actions has standing under this criterion. One who is not 
adversely affected has no standing. A mere allegation of an adverse impact 
is not sufficient. There must also be some causal relationship alleged 
between the injury to the plaintiff, the governmental actions and the relief 
requested. Because standing questions are usually raised prior to the 
introduction of any evidence, we will necessarily be required to make a 
judgment whether proof of such a causal relationship is difficult or 
impossible and whether the relief requested is substantially likely to redress 
the injury claimed. 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (1983). An examination of Appellants' 
Complaint in the Court below reveals its deficiency. 
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A. APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO ALLEGE A DISTINCT AND PALPABLE 
INJURY. 
Mclntyre concedes that for motion to dismiss purposes, all the factual 
allegations of Appellants' complaint are taken as true. However, although the 
exhibits attached to the complaint are considered to be a part of the complaint, 
they may not be used to supply necessary allegations. 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part of a pleading to clarify or 
explain the same, an exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose of 
supplying necessary material averments, and the content of the exhibit is not 
to be taken as part of the allegations of the pleading itself. (Citations 
omitted) 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) (overruled on other grounds -
attorney fees). 
Standing is a material averment and necessary to the decision of the Court 
below - it may not be supplied from the exhibits. To establish standing and, 
therefore, be "aggrieved" under the statute, a plaintiff must "show that he has or 
would suffer a distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the 
outcome." Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 
Tfl7 (quoting Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. State Board, 869 P.2d 909, 913 
(Utah 1993) emphases added; additional citations omitted). 
1. The Sorensons do not have standing because they have not 
alleged or demonstrated even possible injury. 
In the case of the Sorensons, the Appellants5 complaint does not allege any 
particularized injury which might befall them because the Permit issued or 
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Mclntyre built a bridge. They simply claim "me too" to suppositional injury to 
the Browns. Joseph Sorenson is named once as a party, Kathleen Sorenson is 
named once as a party and Sorensons are named in the paragraph describing the 
location of the bridge. (Complaint fflf 3, 4, 12.) As is indicated in the Secor 
Report, neither of the Appellants live in the first level flood plan as does Mclntyre, 
thus neither are in danger of flooding. Nothing in the complaint reasonably 
suggests how Sorenson's might be harmed. At best in the complaint, the 
Sorensons give "mere allegation of an adverse impact" and there is no "causal 
relationship alleged between the injury to Plaintiff, the governmental actions and 
the relief requested." Jenkins, at 1150. 
Importantly in Appellants5 response to Mclntyre's motion to dismiss they 
failed to inform the court below of the nature of the damage which might befall 
their property if Mclntyre were to construct a bridge. (R. 129.) Appellants simply 
relied upon the allegations of their complaint. The allegations of paragraph 30 
state that construction of a bridge will result in irreparable harm and damage to 
plaintiffs and their property, but fail to particularize how. (R. 6.) Even though the 
court below was obliged to accept as true the factual allegations of Plaintiffs' 
complaint, it was not required to accept Plaintiffs' conclusions, nor was it required 
to supplement those allegations with the attachments. 
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2. The Browns' past and continuing subsidence is not an "injury55 
for standing purposes. 
In Browns' case5 the allegations of the complaint are likewise deficient. 
They claim that erosion of the escarpment may cause a loss of lateral support. 
However, it is only by referring to the attachments (the expert report) that one can 
discover any particulars. Most importantly, their expert report concludes that 
bank has been eroding since it became dry land]. Browns built their house atop 
the escarpment anyway. That escarpment's only lateral support derives solely 
from property which no party to this action owns. 
Appellants' expert suggested that the escarpment (owned by a third party) 
needs to be armored regardless of whether a bridge is built, yet the worst floods in 
recorded history did not cause the escarpment to collapse. The Court below 
expressed concern about the amount of speculation to counsel for appellants: 
"How far do I stretch the would suffer[sic]er, cause that seems to be the 
speculative aspect of it. If we reach the 1984 level - if, you know to that 
extent. They would possibly suffer this injury. How far do I stretch that so 
it stays within reality rather than speculation?" 
(R.252,T.P. 7, lines 9-14.) 
With that factual background the court below concluded that there was an 
insufficient factual allegation of damage and nexus. The trial court simply refused 
to speculate in order to afford Appellants' standing. (R. 252, p. 7, lines 8-14.) 
1
 R. 24 (Likely that happened thousands of years ago.) 
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B. THE APPELLANTS FAILED TO ALLEGE A PLAUSIBLE CAUSATION OF 
INJURY. 
The Appellants also failed to establish any causal connection between the 
stream alteration permit and increased injury to property. Sierra Club, at [^32, 
requires such an allegation. The permit itself requires that once constructed the 
bridge abutments shall not encroach upon the stream bed or banks or decrease the 
stream carrying capacity. 
The Secor report annexed to Appellants complaint speculates that the bridge 
may not be built according to plan or that floating debris might be caught by the 
bridge deck and a damming effect caused by the bridge deck; however, it fails to 
explain how any damming effect caused by a bridge several hundred feet upstream 
would do more than simply cause flooding on the first level flood plain (on only 
Mclntyre's property) which would return to the creek \yell upstream of the Calder 
escarpment (which may or may not provide Brown lateral support). Nothing in 
Appellants' complaint describes a necessary cause and effect relationship between 
an injury Browns' claim they may suffer and Mclntyre's construction. 
Nor does the Secor report address why Mclntyre, when faced with such 
flooding of his own home and property, would simply sit by idly. The bridge 
design provides for a removable deck which could be lifted off its supports in the 
reverse of the manner in which it was placed on them. In short, nothing in 
Appellants' complaint describes a necessary cause and effect relationship between 
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an injury Browns' claim they may suffer and the Permit or Mclntyre's 
construction. 
C. REDRESSABILITY AND MOOTNESS. 
Appellants are asking this Court to reverse the decision of Judge Iwasaki 
and send the case back to him for a trial on the merits. Those merits would be 
whether a permit, which has expired on its face, should have been issued in the 
first place. 
Appellants rely on the analysis used in Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, to argue 
that the relief sought would redress Appellants injuries. However, this case is 
unquestionably distinguishable from Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74. The permit issued 
in Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, was an operational permit required for use of the 
plant's operation. Here, there exists no permit required for Mclntyre to use the 
bridge. Rather, the permit is akin to a building permit, allowing for the creek 
environment to be disturbed during construction. The law requires that to 
construct a bridge over a stream, an applicant must first have a permit - but there 
is no similar requirement to use a bridge. The law further requires the State 
Engineer to set a time limit on construction, Utah Code Ann. §73-3-10(5) (1997). 
The time limit of the permit has expired. 
Appellants have failed to demonstrate that denying the stream alteration 
permit at this juncture will redress their suppositional injury of increased property 
12 
subsidence. Appellants did suggest in response to Mclntyre's suggestion of 
mootness and motion to dismiss that the mere filing of a complaint was sufficient 
to put Mclntyre on notice that he might have to remove the bridge if the court 
ultimately determined that the Permit was improvidently granted and they were 
under no obligation to press forward with seeking injunctive relief Mclntyre was 
unable to find support for Appellants view and none was cited in the response. 
Notably, the Appellants never sought any relief requiring the dismantling of 
the bridge. That issue was never before Judge Iwasaki, nor can it be here. Rather 
it is an issue for a different case, should Appellants chose to bring it. In a 
somewhat ironic twist, removal of the bridge would require another application for 
a different stream alteration permit. 
II. APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
To an extent, Appellants attack the evidentiary bases upon which Judge 
Iwasaki made his ruling. As such, they are required to marshal the evidence that 
would support the particularized set of facts to which he applied the legal standard 
and then show that he erred in finding those particular facts. This requires 
Appellants to "marshal all the evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial 
court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence in insufficient to support the findings of 
fact." Save Our Schs v. Bd. ofEduc, 2005 UT 55, f 10 (citations omitted). 
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Appellants have not done so. 
Appellants requested a transcript of only the April 16, 2007 hearing (R. 
248.) However, it is clear that Judge Iwasaki also relied upon evidence adduced at 
the TRO hearing held on March 23, 2007 in order to make his decision (R. 252, p. 
3, lines 9-18.) The TRO hearing was held at the Appellants' behest and was "on 
record." 
Appellants, however, failed to order that transcript and because it was not 
ordered the record is unclear2. 
Appellants have the burden of ordering the transcript and marshaling the 
evidence. Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 201 UT. App. 226, ^41-43. To the 
extent that Judge Iwasaki applied the legal standard for standing to a 
particularized set of facts, some of which were adduced at the March 23, hearing, 
Appellants have failed to marshal the evidence supporting his decision. While it 
is conceded that it is difficult to marshal without a transcript of the March 23, 
2007 hearing, the burden was on the Appellants and it cannot be said that they 
fulfilled that obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Iwasaki's decision should be affirmed because Appellants' claims are 
2
 The minute entry reflects that the hearing was "on record" however, it was reputedly 
held in chambers so a transcript may not be available. 
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moot, they did not have standing and they have failed to marshal the evidence that 
supported his decision. 
Dated this _/? day of February, 2008. 
vm^ 
JakiesA. Mclntyre, 
Sarah E. Viola 
X \Chents\McIntyre ads Brown\McIntyre s replybnef FINAL wpd 
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2 0 0 6RECEIVED 
OCT 12 2006 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
RE; Stream Channel Alteration Permit Number 06-57-29SA to construct a bridge over Little 
Cottonwood Creek at 558 East 5600 South in Salt Lake County. 
EXPIRATION DATE: October 11, 2007 s-jj 
Your application to Alter a Natural Stream Channel Number 06-57-29SA is hereby approved 
pursuant to the requirements of Section 73-3-29 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This 
approval also constitutes compliance with Section 404 (ej of the Clean Water Act (33 USC 
1344) pursuant to General Permit 040 issued to the State of Utah by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers on October 15, 1987, and amended May 4, 2004. 
1. The expiration date of this approved application is October 1L 2007. The expiration 
date may be extended, at the State Engineer's discretion, b}' submitting a written 
request outlining the need for the extension and the reasons for the delay in 
completing the proposed stream alteration. 
2. A copy of this approved permit must be kepi onsite at any time the work under this 
approved permit is in progress. 
3. During high water events, the bridge must be monitored to allow for debris passage. 
4. To avoid proliferation of bridge crossings, this office will require your consideration 
in allowing others to utilize the bridge, provided they adequately compensate you for 
a portion of the cost of bridge construction and gain a legal right-of-way. 
5. Excavated material and construction debris may not be wasted in any stream 'channel 
or placed in flowing waters, this will include material such as grease, oil, joint 
coating, or any other possible pollutant. Excess materials must be wasted at an 
upland site well away from any channel. Construction materials, bedding material, 
excavated material, etc. may not be stockpiled in riparian or channel areas. 
6. Machinery must be properly cleaned and fueled offsite prior to construction. 
7. Equipment should work from the top of the bank or from the channel to minimize 
disturbance to the riparian area and to protect the banks. Heavy equipment should 
avoid crossing and/or disturbing wetlands. 
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'jiis Decision is.suhiect to the provisions of Rule R655-6 of the Division of Water Rights and to 
'Sections 63-46b-13^nd 73-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which provide 
JoTffliHg^thBra^Requesl for Reconsideration with the State Engineer, or an appeal with the 
appropriate District Court. A Request for Reconsideration must be filed with the State Engineer 
within 20 days of the date of this decision. However, a Request for Reconsideration is not a 
prerequisite for a court appeal. A court appeal must be filed within 30 days after the date of this 
Decision, or if a Request for Reconsideration has been filed, within 30 days after the date the 
Request for Reconsideration is denied. A Request for Reconsideration is considered denied 
when no action is taken 20 days after the Request is filed. 
If you have any questions or need further clarification, please contact Roddy Pirouzma at 801-
538-?4^6. 
9W Sincerely, 
Jerry D. Olds, P.E. 
State Engineer 
JDO/rp/jm 
Enclosure 
This permit was mailed on (flcJT II £LOQL> _ to the addressee and the following: 
By: ^ZuU, /^lath^^J 
<yludy Maftson,' Secretary 
JLLJLC^JL O 
John Mann - Regional Engineer 
Dave Ruiter - EPA 
Carolyn Wright - Dept. of Natural Resources 
Ashley Green - Wildlife Resources 
Chris Springer - Salt Lake County 
MCM Engineering 
Calvin S. Johnson 
Lawrence & Marilyn Brown 
Gregory & Susan Hansen 
Joseph & Kathleen Sorenson 
Kirton & McConkie 
